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Abstract
Previous works suggested the use of Branch and Bound techniques
for finding the optimal allocation in (multi-unit) combinatorial auc-
tions. They remarked that Linear Programming could provide a good
upper-bound to the optimal allocation, but they went on using lighter
and less tight upper-bound heuristics, on the ground that LP was too
time-consuming to be used repetitively to solve large combinatorial
auctions. We present the results of extensive experiments solving large
(multi-unit) combinatorial auctions generated according to distribu-
tions proposed by different researchers. Our surprising conclusion is
that Linear Programming is worth using. Investing almost all of one’s
computing time in using LP to bound from above the value of the
optimal solution in order to prune aggressively pays off. We present a
way to save on the number of calls to the LP routine and experimen-
tal results comparing different heuristics for choosing the bid to be
considered next. Those results show that the ordering based on the
square root of the size of the bids that was shown to be theoretically
optimal in a previous paper by the authors performs surprisingly bet-
ter than others in practice. Choosing to deal first with the bid with
largest coefficient (typically 1) in the optimal solution of the relaxed
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LP problem, is also a good choice. The gap between the lower bound
provided by greedy heuristics and the upper bound provided by LP
is typically small and pruning is therefore extensive. For most distri-
butions, auctions of a few hundred goods among a few thousand bids
can be solved in practice. All experiments were run on a PC under
Matlab.
1 Background, Introduction and PreviousWork
The last decade has seen extensive denationalizations and a fundamental
change in economic patterns brought about by the use of the Internet as a
world-wide market place. Both phenomena promoted the use of auctions to
a central place among economic mechanisms. The study of complex auctions
is now a most active area of research, drawing from the fields of Mechanism
Design in Economics and from the Theory of Algorithms in Computer Sci-
ence. Combinatorial auctions in which a large number of items are sold and
in which bidders may express preferences over bundles, i.e., subsets, of items
have drawn a lot of attention recently [8, 10, 9, 11, 12, 2, 4, 7, 3, 1, 6, 13].
We consider here the “winner determination” problem, i.e., the algorith-
mic problem of finding the allocation that maximizes the declared social
welfare. We consider both (single-unit) combinatorial auctions and multi-
unit combinatorial auctions in which a number of identical items of each
type are sold. In [8], this problem was shown to be NP-hard. In [10, 4], it is
shown that it is even hard to find a non-trivial approximation to the optimal
allocation. Those results consider worst-case complexity and do not necessar-
ily imply that, in practice, one cannot find the optimal solution of real-life
large combinatorial auctions. Some of the papers above proposed winner-
determination algorithms and tried to show they perform well even on large
auctions. Others proposed mechanisms based on non-optimal allocations.
A number of researchers proposed sets of problems on which to test candi-
date algorithms: most notably Leyton-Brown, Shoham and Tennenholtz [6],
Leyton-Brown, Pearson and Shoham [5] and de Vries and Vohra [1].
We implemented a Branch-and-Bound search program along the lines
of [3] for finding the optimal allocation in multi-unit combinatorial auctions.
This program makes heavy use of a linear programming routine to bound
from above the value of extensions of partial allocations. Common wisdom
in the field has it that linear programming is too time-consuming to be used
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in practice, and one should use lighter, if if less accurate, methods to obtain
upper-bounds. We report here results that go against this common wisdom:
pruning is of the essence and one should not hesitate to devote all the time
necessary to compute tight upper-bounds in order to prune aggressively. Such
conclusions hold for all the distributions described above. We present, in
Section 2.3, an important way of saving on those expensive calls to the LP
routine. Section 2 presents the algorithm we used and the remainder of the
paper discusses our experimental results.
2 Branch and Bound
2.1 Winner Determination in Multi-Unit Combinato-
rial Auctions
We assume n different commodities and kj identical items of commodity j
for j = 1, . . . n. The problem we are trying to solve is that of determining
the optimal allocation of the items. A set of bids is given: each bid requests
a number of units (possibly zero) from each commodity and offers a price p
for the whole set. A subset of the set of all bids is conflict-free if, for each
commodity, the sum of the units requested does not surpass the number of
units for sale. The problem is to find a conflict-free subset that maximizes
the sum of the prices proposed.
2.2 Our Algorithm
The algorithm we experimented with is very similar to the one described
in [3]. We assume that none of the bids submitted requests more units
than available, i.e., each singleton set of bids is conflict-free. Our algorithm
consists of an initialization phase and a main (recursive) routine.
In the initialization phase, we use a host of fast heuristics to find a good
allocation. In practice, this initialization phase is performed very fast and
gives an allocation that is not much less than the optimal one. Many times,
one, in fact, gets the optimal allocation, but one, obviously, does not know
it is optimal. The heuristics used are all members of the greedy family: one
chooses a bid b, grants it, subtracts the quantities requested by b from the
stock of available units, eliminates all bids that cannot be granted anymore,
i.e., those that are not conflict-free, chooses a bid, and so on. Each heuristic
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provides a feasible allocation. One keeps the best one. The different heuris-
tics we propose to use differ only in the way they choose the next bid to be
granted. The best allocation found is kept.
The main (recursive) routine is given:
1. a partial allocation, i.e., a set of bids already granted,
2. a stock of units available,
3. a set of bids not yet granted, each of them requesting only a number
of units not larger than the number of units in stock, and
4. it uses a global variable describing the best allocation found so far.
The problem is solved by calling the main routine with an empty partial
allocation, the full stock of available units, the set of all bids, and after having
initialized the best allocation to the best allocation found in the initialization
phase.
The main routine is:
1. Stop if the third argument is empty, i.e., no more bids waiting, return,
2. Update if the value of the partial allocation is larger than that of the
best solution found so far, update this best solution,
3. Bound bound from above the value of the optimal allocation of the
units left in stock to the bids that are the third argument of the routine.
This is done by solving the Linear Programming problem that is the
fractional relaxation of the Integer Programming problem describing
the optimal allocation,
4. Prune checks whether the search can be stopped, i.e., the subtree
rooted at the current node can be pruned. The condition for pruning
is that the sum of the values of the partial allocation and the solution
of the Linear Programming problem just found be not greater than the
value of the best allocation found so far. If the condition holds, return.
If the condition does not hold, go on to the next step,
5. Choose choose a bid from the third argument,
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6. Left Call call recursively the main routine with a partial allocation
augmented by the bid just chosen, the stock of available units dimin-
ished by subtracting the units requested by the bid chosen and the
list of bids diminished by subtracting the chosen bid and all bids that
request more units than available in (the diminished) stock,
7. Right Call call recursively the main routine with the original partial
allocation, the original stock and the list of bids without the chosen
bid.
The Left Call solves the auction obtained after the chosen bid has been
granted. The Right Call solves the auction obtained after the chosen bid
has been denied.
The only step under-specified in this routine is Choose: we shall discuss
at length how the next bid to branch on should be chosen in Section 6. The
only time-consuming step in the main routine is the Linear Programming
step in Bound. We have a way to save on those expensive calls to the LP
routine.
2.3 Saving on calls to LP
Notice that, in Right Call, the problem to be solved is very similar to the
original one: same partial allocation, same stock. This recursive call will
trigger a call to the LP routine (call it LP2) solving a LP problem that is
very similar to the one just solved (call it LP1). The only difference is that
the bid just chosen has disappeared from the list of bids considered by LP2.
If this bid did not enter the optimal (fractional) solution of LP1, i.e., if its
coefficient in the solution of LP1 was equal to zero, then, the solution of LP2
is the same as that of LP1 and therefore one can save a call to the LP routine.
One can easily see that, in this case, no pruning can take place. Figure 1
shows that the saving can be considerable. The auctions are taken from [6].
On the x-axis: the number of bids considered, on the y-axis: under log scale,
the number of nodes visited or the number of calls to the LP routine.
3 Experimental Parameters
We ran all our experiments on a Pentium Pro 930 MHz with 512K of memory,
running Windows 2000. Our programs were coded in Matlab (R12). We used
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Figure 1: Number of nodes visited vs. Number of calls to the LP routine
the linprog facility of the Optimization ToolBox for Linear Programming:
this is a primal-dual algorithm. All our results are averages over fifteen
auctions drawn from a distribution to be specified for each graph. We did
experience some memory problems (probably due to some remaining bugs in
Matlab Release 12), but found Matlab extremely easy to use and its linprog
facility excellent. The remainder of the paper presents, in graphic form, the
results of our experiments. Some of those graphs are difficult to decipher in
black and white: we apologize and will produce more readable graphs for the
conference paper.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Global Picture
Figure 2 describes the quality of the optimal solution, the lower bound ob-
tained in the initialization phase and two upper bounds for multi-unit auc-
tions. The upper curve (extended norm bound) describes the easy to compute
upper bound proposed in [6]. The second (from the top) curve describes the
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upper bound given by Linear Programming. The latter can be proved to
be always at most equal to the former. On the x-axis: the number of bids
considered (from 250 to 750) and the y-axis the average value (in monetary
terms, numbers are not important) of the allocations. This graph shows two
things. First, that the lower bound computed in the initialization phase and
the upper bound computed by LP are very close. The optimal solution is,
obviously, in-between. The larger the auction, the better the convergence
of those three values. The second thing is that the easy-to-compute upper-
bound of [6] is not even close to the LP bound and seems to get (relatively)
worse as the number of bids increases. The main claim of this paper is that
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Figure 2: Optimal solution vs. Lower Bound and two Upper Bounds
using the time-consuming LP routine is preferable to the use of a lighter
but easier to compute upper bound in Bound. Figure 3 compares the run-
ning times of the algorithm above that uses LP and the running time of the
same algorithm using the easy-to-compute upper bound proposed by Leyton-
Brown and al. The distribution of auctions is taken from [6], for auctions
of different sizes. On the x-axis: the number of bids. On the y-axis: the
running time in seconds (log scale). By using LP, one gains two orders of
magnitude for large auctions. The lighter upper bound is better for very
small numbers of bidders.
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Figure 3: Running Times using LP vs. Leyton-Brown’s upper bound
5 Initialization Phase
In the initialization phase, in order to find a good solution to be used for
pruning, we propose to use many greedy heuristics and keep the best solution
found. Figure 4 describes the quality of 16 different greedy heuristics on
auctions of varying size (100 to 1000 bids, always 10 goods) taken from the
distribution of [6]. On the y-axis: the percentage of the value of the optimal
solution reached by the approximation: 100 means perfect approximation,
50 means half of the optimal solution. One expects that criteria that pick
up more promising bids first give better results. This is what happens. One
sees three main groups. The middle group includes two criteria: picking
at random and picking following the (in fact random) order with which bids
were given. The lower (worst) group of criteria comprises criteria that choose
unattractive bids first. The higher group contains all criteria we thought
attractive. It contains both unnormalized and normalized criteria (see [3]).
The square-root criterion:
r(a) =
p√∑n
j=1 qj
, (1)
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Figure 4: Value of different greedy heuristics
that has been proved to be theoretically optimal, gives the best approxima-
tion. The average price per unit gives markedly inferior results. Two criteria
based on Linear Programming give pretty good results. The first one solves
the relaxed LP problem for the original auction and orders the bids according
to their coefficient in the optimal solution, in descending order. The second,
improved one, is an adaptative version of the first: it solves a LP problem
before choosing each bid (after having eliminated all bids that cannot be
granted in full). More on those criteria is found in Section 6.
6 Choosing the bid on which to branch
The main factor in determining the efficiency of our Branch-and-Bound al-
gorithm is the criterion used in choosing the next bid on which to branch
in step Choose. Figure 5 compares different such criteria. The graph com-
pares six different criteria. The auctions were taken from [6]. The x-axis
shows the number of bids and the y-axis, with a log scale, shows the average
number of the nodes visited. The square root criterion of Equation 1 seems
best. Nevertheless the LP coefficient criterion and the LP improved criterion
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Figure 5: Number of nodes visited for different choosing criteria
described in Section 5 did very well and even seem better than the square
root criterion for large numbers of bids. Figure 6 extends the previous graph
to larger auctions, for the best criteria only (for the other criteria we could
not finish the search). The criteria based on LP are definitely best.
7 Run Time
We now describe running times for auctions of different sizes, under different
distributions. Figure 7 uses the distribution proposed in [6]. Auctions have
been generated for 10, 12, 14 and 16 goods. On the x-axis: the number of
bids. On the y-axis: running times in seconds (log scale). The curves are
sub-linear on a logarithmic scale and exhibit the sub-exponential running
time of our algorithm. This graph improves substantially on the similar
graph found in [3], showing, again, the advantage of using LP. This graph
also shows faster running times for large auctions than the ones presented
in [6]. Figure 8 presents similar results for a fixed number of bids (125), for
different numbers of goods. The curve is very clearly sub-linear. Contrary
to CAMUS, our BB algorithm exhibits a sub-exponential dependence on the
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Figure 7: Running Times for Leyton-Brown and al.’s distribution
11
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
100
101
102
103
no. of goods
ru
n
 ti
m
e 
in
 s
ec
on
ds
, (o
ve
r 1
25
 bi
ds
)
Figure 8: Running Times for Leyton-Brown and al.’s distribution
number of goods.
Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 describe the running times of our algorithm
over four distributions described by de Vries and Vohra [1]. The auctions
generated there are single-unit combinatorial auctions.
Figure 13 concerns auctions drawn according to the CATS multipaths
distribution of the Test Suite in [5]. Notice that our algorithm solves quite
easily even auctions with up to 20000 bids. It seems, then, that the CATS
multipaths distribution generates problems that are much easier, on average,
than those generated by the distribution previously proposed in [6]. This
claim is supported by 14. For large numbers of bids, the CATS multipaths
distribution indeed generates problems that are easier to solve. There is a
simple explanation as to why our BB algorithm solves easily CATS auctions
with very large numbers of bids: in fact, one call to the LP routine is typically
enough. What happens is that the initialization phase finds an allocation of
value v and the first call to the LP routine finds a fractional solution of same
value v. This means that the LP fractional problem has an integer solution
and the initialization phase found an optimal solution. Our BB algorithm
prunes the first node. Figure 15 shows the running times of our algorithm for
the distributions of single unit combinatorial auctions suggested by CATS.
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Figure 9: Running Times for Sandholm Random distribution
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Figure 10: Running Times for Sandholm Weighted Random distribution
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Figure 11: Running Times for Sandholm Uniform distribution: sets of size 3
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Figure 12: Running Times for Sandholm Decay distribution: α = 55%
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Figure 13: Running Times for multipaths distribution
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Figure 14: Relative Difficulty of Leyton-Brown and al.’s distributions
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8 Conclusions
Our first conclusion is that, even though winner determination is theoretically
intractable, it can be performed in practice for auctions of a few hundreds
goods among a few thousands bids, without a super-computer and with-
out low-level programming optimization. The suggestion of [4] to consider
approximately-efficient mechanisms, may have been premature. The chal-
lenge is now to tackle auctions of a few thousands goods (such as the FCC
auction). But for such situations, the conceptual framework we have worked
with in this paper is most probably not adequate: bidders cannot be expected
to describe their preferences by an explicit list of bids. Suitable languages
for expressing preferences must be found and algorithmic problems studied
in such a new framework.
Our second conclusion is that the difficulty in solving combinatorial auc-
tions stems more from the number of items for sale than from the number
of bids. If the number of bids is large, with respect to the number of items,
Linear Programming often finds the optimal integer solution in one call.
Our third conclusion is that the method of choosing the next bid on which
to branch is extremely important in determining the efficiency of the search.
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More work is needed to understand what makes a good choice and why the
square-root criterion of Equation 1 and the LP adaptative criterion described
in Section 6 are so good.
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